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Executive Summary 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Exploratory Team meeting, 
“Model-Driven Paradigms for Integrated Approaches to Cyber Defense”, was 
organized by the NATO Science and Technology Organizations’ (STOs’) 
Information Systems and Technology (IST) panel and conducted its meetings and 
electronic exchanges during 2016. This report describes the proceedings and 
outcomes of the team’s efforts.  
Many of the defensive activities in the fields of cyber warfare and information 
assurance rely on essentially ad hoc techniques. The cyber community recognizes 
that comprehensive, systematic, principle-based modeling and simulation are more 
likely to produce long-term, lasting, reusable approaches to defensive cyber 
operations.  
A model-driven paradigm is predicated on creation and validation of mechanisms 
of modeling the organization whose mission is subject to assessment, the mission 
(or missions) itself, and the cyber-vulnerable systems that support the mission. This 
by any definition is a complex socio-technical system (of systems), and the level of 
detail of this class of problems ranges from the level of host and network events to 
the systems’ functions up to the function of the enterprise/business. Solving this 
class of problems is of medium to high difficulty and can draw in part on advances 
in Systems Engineering (SE). Such model-based approaches and analysis could be 
used to explore multiple alternative mitigation and work-around strategies and to 
select the optimal course of mitigating actions. Furthermore, the model-driven 
paradigm applied to cyber operations is likely to benefit traditional disciplines of 
cyber defense such as security, vulnerability analysis, intrusion prevention, 
intrusion detection, analysis, forensics, attribution, and recovery.  
The team identified a number of challenges for model-driven paradigms for cyber 
defense and elected to review 2 of them in detail: the problems of modeling the 
adversarial aspects, including wargaming, of cyber warfare and modeling human 
cognitive processes in relation to cyber activities. 
Recommendations include the following:  
• Stress the need for modeling and simulation for full range of cyber 
specialties, not only for training and rehearsal.  
• Encourage participation of commercial companies, in NATO STO activities 
and meetings, with an option to demonstrate their relevant products. 
 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 
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• Simulation models that we call here “Business Impact Simulation” are 
particularly important for NATO, but simulation models we call here 
“Attack Details Simulation” are crucial for NATO. 
• Produce a set of clear and concrete requirements for modeling and 
simulation (M&S) tools specifically targeted at cyber defense and 
leveraging advances in SE. 
• Simulation of attack-defense scenarios at a level of observable, component-
network-and-system-level events. 
• Minimize government investments in the line of approaches based on attack 
graphs and related methods to invest in other directions of cyber (M&S). 
• Encourage academic research targeted at effective and validated M&S of 
human cognitive processes and behaviors as they execute cyber defense and 
attack.  
The team initiated publication of a special issue of the Journal of Defense Modeling 
and Simulation dedicated specifically to model-driven paradigms for cyber defense. 
It also formulated a Technical Activity Proposal and obtained NATO IST approval 
for a workshop titled “Modelling and Simulation S&T: Critical Enabler for Cyber 
Defence”, details of which appear in Appendix A.
 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 
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1. Introduction 
This report describes the proceedings and outcomes of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) Exploratory Team meeting, “Model-Driven Paradigms for 
Integrated Approaches to Cyber Defense” (IST-ET-094), organized by the NATO 
Science and Technology Organizations’ (STOs’) Information Systems and 
Technology (IST) panel. Two meetings for IST-ET-094 were held: an inaugural 
workshop at the University of Lübeck in Lübeck, Germany, 14–18 March 2016, 
and the final meeting at the Royal Military Academy in Brussels, Belgium, 12–14 
September 2016. 
The STO’s mission is to help position the NATO nations’ and NATO’s science and 
technology (S&T) investments as a strategic enabler of the knowledge and 
technology advantage for the defense and security posture of NATO nations and 
partner nations. This is accomplished by conducting and promoting S&T activities 
that augment and leverage the capabilities and programs of the alliance, of the 
NATO nations, and the partner nations, in support of NATO’s objectives. It is 
further accomplished by contributing to NATO’s ability to enable and influence 
security and defense-related capability development and threat mitigation in NATO 
nations and partner nations, in accordance with NATO policies, and by supporting 
decision making in the NATO nations and NATO.  
IST, the immediate sponsor of this workshop, is one of the 5 NATO S&T panels 
whose role it is, with the NATO modeling and simulation (M&S) Group, to 
implement, on behalf of the S&T Board, the STO mission with respect to 
information systems technology. The focus of this panel is the advancement and 
exchange of techniques and technologies to provide timely, affordable, dependable, 
secure, and relevant information to warfighters, planners, and strategists, as well as 
enabling information systems technologies for modeling, simulation, and training. 
The IST covers the fields of information warfare and assurance, architecture and 
intelligent information systems, and communications and networks.  
The motivation for the workshop had to do with the fact that while many of these 
defensive activities currently rely on essentially ad hoc techniques, there is a 
growing realization within the cyber community that comprehensive, systematic, 
principle-based M&S are more likely to produce long-term, lasting, reusable 
approaches to defensive cyber operations. In particular, a recent NATO workshop 
(IST-128-RWS-019, “Cyber Attack Detection, Forensics and Attribution for 
Assessment of Mission Impact”) voiced a strong consensus that substantive 
solutions for at least some classes of cyber challenges, for example mission impact 
assessment, require adopting and developing a new model-driven paradigm. Such 
 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 
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a paradigm is predicated on creation and validation of mechanisms of modeling the 
organization whose mission is subject to assessment, the mission (or missions) 
itself, and the cyber-vulnerable systems that support the mission. 
The models are then used to simulate or otherwise portray the cyber attacks and 
associate defensive phenomena and system operations, including assessment of 
mission impact. This by any definition is a complex socio-technical system (of 
systems) and the level of detail of this class of problems ranges from the level of 
host and network events to the systems functions up to the function of the 
enterprise/business. Solving this class of problems is of medium to high difficulty 
and can draw in part on advances in Systems Engineering (SE). Such model-based 
approach and analysis could be used to explore multiple alternative mitigation and 
work-around strategies and then select the optimal course of mitigating actions. 
Furthermore, the model-driven paradigm applied to cyber operations is likely to 
benefit traditional disciplines of cyber defense, such as security, vulnerability 
analysis, intrusion prevention, intrusion detection, analysis, forensics, attribution, 
and recovery. For example, intrusion detection, especially for zero-day or 
polymorphic attacks, would greatly benefit from the ability to model the observable 
effects of a hypothetical attack. 
The team identified 2 major subspaces of model-driven paradigms for attack 
analysis cyber modeling and simulation problems in attack analysis, as shown in 
Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1 Two major subspaces of cyber modeling and simulation problems 
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The team identified a number of challenges for model-driven paradigms for cyber 
defense and elected to review 2 of them in detail. A section of this report reviews 
the problem of modeling the adversarial aspects, including wargaming, of cyber 
warfare. Another section reviews the modeling of human cognitive processes in 
relation to cyber activities. 
Other results and outcomes of the Exploratory Team included the following: 
• The team formulated a number of conclusions and recommendations, 
summarized in Section 5 of this report. 
• The team initiated publication of a special issue of the Journal of Defense 
Modeling and Simulation dedicated specifically to model-driven paradigms 
for cyber defense (Appendix B). 
• The team formulated a Technical Activity Proposal and obtained NATO 
IST approval for a workshop titled “Modelling and Simulation S&T: 
Critical Enabler for Cyber Defence” (Appendix C). 
• The team explored a number of commercial and open-source tools that 
appeared to be relevant to modeling and simulation of cyber security 
activities (Appendix D). 
• The team started to explore model-based approaches in SE in terms of utility 
for cyber defense, the rationale being that such approaches are gaining 
commercial use for the design and development of information technology 
systems and components and therefore are relevant to cyber M&S. As the 
broader developments and thinking in this area remained immature, it was 
identified as a topic of specific interest in the workshop (see Appendix C). 
2. Contributors 
Participating nations included Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, the United Kingdom 
(UK), Poland, Romania, Turkey, and the United States. The participants included 
the following: 
• Alexander Kott (USA) 
• Wim Mees (Belgium) 
• Felix Kuhr (Germany) 
• Nazife Baykal (Turkey) 
• Cristian-Mihai Vidu (Romania) 
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• Matteo Merialdo (Italy) 
• Mona Lange (Germany) 
• Marek Malowidzki (Poland) 
• Bhopinder K Madahar (UK) 
Remote (teleconference) attendees included the following: 
• Margaret Varga (UK) 
• Nikolai Stoianov (Bulgaria) 
3. Modeling Adversarial Aspects of Cyber Attacks 
Primary Author: Alexander Kott (USA) 
The ability to reason about or model actions of the adversary in relation to 
defender’s actions appears to be a significant aspect of modeling in cyber defense. 
Terms like “wargaming” or “adversarial reasoning” apply to such forms of M&S. 
In this section, we review the literature and provide related observations regarding 
these aspects of modeling in cyber defense. 
An Illustrative Description of a Class of Modeling with Wargaming 
Exploring wargaming aspects of cyber modeling, ET-094 elected to focus on a 
specific class of problems. In the following, we describe the class that has to do 
with in-depth analysis of cyberattack progression inspired by adversarial reasoning 
and automated wargaming approaches in conventional, kinetic warfare (e.g., Kott 
et al. 2002; Rasch et al. 2003). 
Given data about friendly infrastructure, applications, and defensive mechanisms, 
and some assumptions about enemy intent and capability, the objective was to find 
the following: 
• A set of most-probable detailed steps of enemy courses of action (COAs), 
as modulated by friendly defensive actions 
• Detailed steps should be at observable level of details such as could be 
found in host system logs and network traffic packet capture files. 
• For each COA estimate, find the probability of enemy actions failing or 
detected by friendly systems/people.  
• Include considerations of cognitive processes and limits of defenders (and 
perhaps of attackers)  
 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 
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• Target this type of model for several types of integrated utilization: 
developing prevention and detection agents, forensics, risk assessment, 
friendly COA development, and cyber battle command. 
3.1 Taxonomy and Literature Review of Common Types of 
Models in Cyber Defense 
The following comprise an overview of the taxonomy and definitions used for the 
review: 
• Emulation (often with simulation) of networks: actual hardware, software, 
and humans (e.g., cyber ranges) 
• Training-focused simulations: presenting to human trainees the effects of a 
cyber attack without modeling underlying processes 
• M&S of human cognitive processing of cyber events and situations: 
perception, recognition, situational awareness (SA), and decision making 
• M&S of attack progress and malware propagation 
o Attack-graph-based approaches 
o Epidemiology analogy (e.g., Susceptible, Infected, Recovered [SIR]) 
• Abstract wargaming: game-theoretic model of cyber conflict without 
modeling the underlying processes of cyber attack and defense 
• Business processes models: defense, offense, and business processes, along 
with business information technology architecture, simulated for observing 
resulting effects 
• Statistical models of cyber events: cyber processes represented as, for 
example, equations of Poisson processes, and coefficients learned from 
training dataset 
• Two classes of models used to support cyber modeling but do not model 
cyber aspects: 
• Physical systems models to support modeling of cyber-physical effects 
• Network simulation models 
The following section summarizes each element of the taxonomy with brief review 
of related literature. 
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3.2 Emulation 
This often includes elements of both emulation and simulation of networks, 
simulation of an attack on the network and its progress, and might include human 
defenders and attackers. Many cyber ranges (CRs) are based on this paradigm, 
which is often used to evaluate a system or technology concept, as evidenced in the 
following literature: 
• CyberVAN [accessed 23 Jan 2016]. http://www.appcomsci.com/research 
/tools/cybervan.   
• Serban C et al. Testing android devices for tactical networks: a hybrid 
emulation testbed approach. Proceedings of the Military Communications 
Conference. New York (NY): Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers; 2015. 
Davis J, Magrath S. A survey of cyber ranges and testbeds. Edinburgh 
(Australia): Cyber and Electronic Warfare Division, Defence Science and 
Technology Organization; 2013. Report No.: DSTO-GD-0771. 
The authors explored the approaches used to build existing CRs, the merits 
of each approach and their functionality. The review first categorizes CRs 
by their type and second by their supporting sector: academic, military, or 
commercial. The types of CR are identified as simulation, overlay, or 
emulation. CRs are considered simulations if they use software models of 
real world objects to explore behavior. They are labelled as overlays if they 
operate on live production hardware with experiments sharing their 
production resources rather than using a dedicated CR laboratory. CRs are 
labelled emulations if they run real software applications on dedicated 
hardware. Emulation refers to the software layer that allows fixed CR 
hardware to be reconfigured to different topologies for each experiment. 
The review found CRs are predominantly used for training. 
In ET-094 foci, humans are also simulated for purposes of reducing bias, improving 
controllability, repeatability of runs, and the ability to perform large number of runs 
to discover novel patters and phenomena. Thus, we focus on full constructive 
simulations. 
Such models are well suited for wargames between human attackers and defenders. 
Unfortunately, repeatability of such wargames is poor, and it is difficult to make 
generalized conclusions from such wargames. 
 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 
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3.3 Training-Focused Simulations 
These are usually limited to presenting to the trainee with the effects of a cyber attack 
without modeling underlying processes. Examples in literature include the 
following: 
• Marshall H et al. Cyber operations battlefield web services (COBWebS): 
concept for a tactical cyber warfare effect training prototype. Proceedings of 
the 2015 Fall Simulation Interoperability Workshop; Simulation 
Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO): 2015. 
• Littlejohn AM, Makhlouf E. Test and evaluation of the malicious activity 
simulation tool (MAST) in a local area network (LAN) running the common 
PC operating system environment (COMPOSE). Monterey (CA): Naval 
Postgraduate School; 2013. 
The paper notes that training network administrators is a rather expensive 
and time-consuming process. MAST aims to provide realistic, tailored 
simulation of malicious activity for the purpose of training network 
administrators to recognize and respond to threats on the network they 
manage. 
• Chapman IM et al. Taxonomy of cyber attacks and simulation of their 
effects. Proceedings of the 2011 Military Modeling & Simulation 
Symposium. San Diego (CA): Society for Computer Simulation 
International; 2011. 
The authors propose methods to simulate the effects of several cyber attack 
types for use in simulation in support of training and experimentation. 
Such models are not generally suitable for wargaming. 
3.4 M&S of Human Cognitive Processing 
These focus on modeling how humans process cyber events and situations: 
perception, recognition, SA, and decision making, examples of which are in the 
following literature: 
• Cho J-H, Cam H, Oltramari A. Effect of personality traits on trust and risk 
to phishing vulnerability: modeling and analysis. Cognitive Methods in 
Situation Awareness and Decision Support (CogSIMA), IEEE International 
Multi-Disciplinary Conference; 2016 Nov 2–4; Beirut, Lebanon. 
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• Ben-Asher N, Oltramari A, Erbacher RF, Gonzalez C. Ontology-based 
adaptive systems of cyber defense. Proceedings of the 10th International 
Conference on Semantic Technology for Intelligence, Defense, and 
Security (STIDS); 2015. 
Jones RM, et al. Modeling and integrating cognitive agents within the 
emerging cyber domain. Proceedings of the Interservice/Industry Training, 
Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC); 2015. 
The application of cognitive agents to the roles of cyber offense and defense 
would provide a more complete cyber ecology for training purposes and 
thus a more realistic training experience for the student. There are 2 key 
challenges to creating such cyber agents: 1) modeling the complex and 
continually evolving processes of cyber operations within a cognitive 
architecture and 2) defining the tools and data standards to enable cognitive 
agents to interoperate with networks in a portable way. This paper discusses 
novel models of cyber offensive and defensive behavior based on 
observation and elaboration of human expertise. It also offers an approach 
to the creation of software adapters that translate from task-level actions to 
network-level events to support agent-network interoperability. 
• Robinson D, Cybenko G. A cyber-based behavioral model. The Journal of 
Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, 
Technology. 2012;9(3):195–203.  
This research examines aspects of the cognitive level by defining a cyber-
based behavioral model contingent on the activities a user performs while 
on the Internet. The authors believe this is foundational to completely define 
a cyber SA model, thus providing commanders and decision makers a more 
comprehensive and real-time view of the environment in which they are 
operating. 
Such models are not directly suitable for wargaming but can be valuable 
components of a complete wargaming system. 
3.5 M&S Based on Attack Graph Concept 
Examples in literature include the following: 
• Skybox Security. Using risk modeling and attack simulation for proactive 
cyber security [accessed 23 Jan 2016]. https://www.skyboxsecurity.com/. 
Explains what they mean by cyber M&S and its purposes. Their approach 
is clearly not able to reproduce observables, and therefore they do not 
 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 
9 
mention detection and forensics as its purposes, but they do stress predictive 
aspect. 
• Kotenko I, Chechulin A. A cyber attack modeling and impact assessment 
framework. Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Cyber 
Conflict. New York (NY): Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers; 
2013. 
The paper suggests a framework for cyber attack modeling and impact 
assessment. It is supposed that the common approach to attack modeling 
and impact assessment is based on representing malefactors’ behavior, 
generating attack graphs, calculating security metrics, and providing risk 
analysis procedures. The architecture of the Cyber Attack Modeling and 
Impact Assessment Component (CAMIAC) is proposed. The authors 
present the prototype of the component, the results of experiments carried 
out, and comparative analysis of the techniques used. 
• Sommestad T et al. The cyber security modeling language: a tool for 
assessing the vulnerability of enterprise system architectures. IEEE Systems 
Journal. 2013;7(3):363–373. 
The Cyber Security Modeling Language (CySeMoL) is a modeling 
language for enterprise-level system architectures coupled to a probabilistic 
inference engine. If the computer systems of an enterprise are modeled with 
CySeMoL, this inference engine can assess the probability that attacks on 
the systems will succeed. The theory used for the attack-probability 
calculations in CySeMoL is a compilation of research results on a number 
of security domains and covers a range of attacks and countermeasures.  
Such models are not normally used for wargaming purposes. In principle, a 
wargaming element could be added if the defender could execute actions directed 
at closing some attack paths. 
3.6 M&S Based on Epidemiology Analogy 
These use the popular SIR-type models. Examples in the literature include the 
following:  
• Marvel LM et al. A framework to evaluate cyber agility. Proceedings of the 
2015 Military Communications Conference. New York (NY): Institute of 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE); 2015.  
• Thompson B, Morris-King J, Cam H. Controlling risk of data exfiltration in 
cyber networks due to stealthy propagating malware; 2017 in press. 
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Using a SIR-type approach, the authors present a compartmental stochastic 
model to represent changes in the state of the network and analytically 
derive an upper bound on the rate at which an attacker can exfiltrate data 
without arousing suspicion.  
Such models are not normally used for wargaming. However, they could be if 
defender could execute actions that limit the spread of malware. 
3.7 Abstract Wargaming 
Here, a game-theoretic process is modeled with moves and effects inspired by cyber 
conflict but without modeling the underlying processes of cyber attack and defense. 
Examples in literature include the following: 
• Cho J-H, Gao J. Cyber war game in temporal networks. PloS One. 
2016;11(2);e0148674. 
• Manshaei MH et al. Game theory meets network security and privacy. ACM 
Computing Surveys (CSUR). 2013;45(3):25. 
This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of research 
on security and privacy in computer and communication networks that uses 
game-theoretic approaches. The authors organize the presented works in 6 
main categories: 1) security of the physical and media access control layers, 
2) security of self-organizing networks, 3) intrusion detection systems,  
4) anonymity and privacy, 5) economics of network security, and  
6) cryptography. In each category, they identify security problems, players, 
and game models. 
• Backhaus S et al. Cyber-physical security: a game theory model of humans 
interacting over control systems. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid. 
2013;4(4):2320–2327. 
Accurate predictions require good models of not just the physical and 
control systems, but also of human decision making. In this article, the 
authors present an approach to develop such tools, specifically models of 
the decisions of the cyber-physical intruder who is attacking the systems 
and the system operator who is defending it, and demonstrate its usefulness 
for design. 
Such models are explicitly designed for game-solving purposes. It is not exactly 
wargaming but very close. 
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3.8 Business Process-Based Models 
Defense, offense, and business processes are modeled as process diagrams and 
simulated for the sake of observing resulting effects. An example in the literature 
is the following: 
• Noel S et al. Analyzing mission impacts of cyber actions (AMICA). NATO; 
2015. Report No.: IST-128. 
Such models are essentially used for automated wargaming. 
3.9 Statistical Models 
Here, cyber processes are represented as, for example, equations of Poisson process 
and coefficients are learned from training dataset, as in the following example: 
• Gil S, Kott A, Barabási A-L. A genetic epidemiology approach to cyber-
security. Scientific Reports 4. 2014 July 16. doi:10:1038/srep05659. 
By themselves, such models are not suitable for wargaming. However, they could 
be a useful component of a wargaming system. 
3.10 Maturity Models 
There is growing research interest in developing models that can better represent 
the ability and maturity of organizations to manage risks and threats in cyber space. 
These are conceptual models, building on software engineering and information 
technology (IT) risk management approaches and others, to outline and assess 
characteristics associated with various levels of maturity. Consequently they serve 
as weakness indicators and mitigation/improvement maps to help improve cyber 
defenses and resilience. Examples in the literature include the following: 
Poeppelbuss J et al. Maturity models in information systems research: 
literature search and analysis. Communications of the Association for 
Information Systems. 2011;29(1). 
Reviewed research related to models such as Capability Maturity Model 
(e.g., CMM and CMMi), which are well known. Findings are that research 
was generally critical to the applicability and reliability of existing models, 
which need greater rigor in their measurement and conceptualization.   
• Becker J et al. Developing maturity models for IT management – a 
procedure model and its application. Business & Information Systems 
Engineering. 2009;3. 
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Though the focus is on the development of the IT Performance 
Measurement Maturity Model, the research identifies the gaps that need to 
be addressed. It uses the guidelines for Design Science proposed by Hevner 
(2004) and postulates 8 requirements for the design process of models. This 
opens up potential for improvements (e.g., detailed specifications and 
epistemological substantiation of requirements) and inform higher-level 
cyber maturity models.  
• White GB. The community cyber security maturity model. Proceedings of 
the 40th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences; 2007. 
This paper considers the development of maturity models for improving 
cyber defense within communities; that is, assessment of preparedness 
against cyber attacks. A Community Cyber Security Maturity Model is 
proposed to identify weaknesses and develop programs to enhance security 
posture.  
• Healey J, van Bochoven L. NATO’s cyber capabilities: yesterday, today, and 
tomorrow. Atlantic Council, Smarter Alliance Initiative Issue Brief; 2012. 
This is a think piece on NATO cyber capabilities and recommendations as 
to the key enablers for the future. One of these is adoption of relevant 
information security and IT standards and adoption of models related to risk 
and maturity such as the Resilience Management Model.  
These works suggest linking developments across security, IT risk management, and 
business resilience areas for assessing and enhancing cyber capability of 
organizations. A software-based framework, the Cyber Defense Capability 
Assessment Tool (see https://apmg-cyber.com/products/cdcat), has been developed 
to model cyber capabilities of an enterprise. Though such frameworks and maturity 
models are not currently part of cyber M&S, they do provide an important contextual 
view within which the more detailed M&S can be undertaken; for example, by 
identifying where the cyber weaknesses are within an enterprise (e.g., people, 
processes, and technology) and applying M&S to specific parts to exercise higher-
level decisions and actions.  
Maturity models are not suitable for wargaming but can be used to provide context 
to exercises such as exploring maturity of processes. 
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4. Human Cognitive Modeling in Cyber Security 
Primary Author: Noam Ben-Asher (USA) 
Many technological advances in cyber security have facilitated advanced 
monitoring and threat detection. However, the ever-growing sophistication of 
attackers deters the ongoing attempt to automate critical tasks that cyber defenders 
perform. Human analytical capabilities, the ability to discern suspicious activity, 
and authority to make decisions on threats place the human defender as a key player 
in cyber defense. As such, there is a substantial interest in understanding human 
cognitive activities and behaviors that drive detection of cyber threats and response 
selection. Modeling and simulating these processes can allow us to discern the 
underlying mechanisms, revealing their strengths and deficiencies. Modeling and 
simulating also provide the necessary conditions for proactive defense.  
However, progression in modeling and simulating human cognition in cyber 
defense confronts significant hurdles. The first relates to the limited availability of 
reliable data that capture defenders’ decision making processes as well as the cyber 
environment in which they operate. Besides it being extremely hard to collect 
highly complex data, in many cases such data are confidential and cannot be shared 
with the research community. A second hurdle relates to the lack of unified theory 
of cyber detection in general and specifically defining the role defenders’ cognition 
plays, what mental models defenders use, and how human cognition interfaces with 
detection tools. As a result, research on cyber defenders’ cognitive activities and 
behaviors is highly fragmented. Furthermore, due to the complexity of the domain 
and the limited ability to collect data from professional security experts, the 
tendency to use simplified tasks and experimentation often involves participants 
with limited or no understanding in cyber security. 
Gonzalez et al. (2014) identified the following 4 critical aspects of cyber defender 
cognitive modeling: 
• High levels models of defender-in-the-loop 
• Perception and representation of the highly dynamic cyber environment, 
including vulnerabilities, assets, and threats among others 
• Cyber SA, how it relates to SA in the physical world, and what are the 
cognitive demands to achieve cyber SA 
• Decision-making processes including learning, adaptation, and decision 
biases 
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• Scaling up from the individual defender to interactions within a team of 
defenders or between a defender and an attacker 
In the following we review literature related to each of these domains. 
4.1 Models of Human in the Cyber Detection Loop 
High-level modeling of defender-in-the-loop often attempts to map and define the 
human analyst role in detection processes. These high-level models often focus on 
information flows, task analysis, and interactions with decision support tools. Such 
preliminary models can provide systematic mapping of the roles, tasks, and 
responsibilities of human defenders, plus what tools are used in different scenarios, 
and lay the foundations for automating some of these tasks. Examples in literature 
include the following: 
• D’Amico A, Whitley K. The real work of computer network defense 
analysts. Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Visualization 
for Cyber Security. Berlin (Germany): Springer; 2008. p. 19–37.  
• D’Amico A et al. Achieving cyber defense SA: a cognitive task analysis of 
information assurance analysts. Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting. 2005;49(3). 
One of the most human labor-intensive aspects of cyber defense is triage 
analysis, where the human defenders review and sort a large volume of 
network activities data that already happened and corresponding intrusion 
detection alerts. These studies are based on cognitive task analysis 
conducted to baseline the state of the practice in the US Department of 
Defense Computer Network Defense community. Based upon these 
observations, the authors propose an analyst-in-the-loop workflow model 
that encapsulates analytic goals, tasks, types of decisions made, data sources 
used to make those decisions, cognitive demands, and tools used. 
• Oltramari A et al. General requirements of a hybrid-modeling framework 
for cyber security. Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE Military Communications 
Conference; 2014. 
• Jones RM et al. Modeling and integrating cognitive agents within the 
emerging cyber domain. Proceedings of the Interservice/Industry Training, 
Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC); 2015. 
The authors propose to harness cognitive architectures such as Soar and 
ACT-R to build executable cognitive agents that can interact with real cyber 
networks in real time. This all-embracing development of a cognitive model 
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of a cyber defender is driven by cognitive task analysis and knowledge 
elicitation from subject matter experts. This knowledge is assimilated into 
the procedural, semantic, and episodic long-term memories of the cognitive 
agent. Based on goals and inputs from perception, an agent can query long-
term memories and choose the appropriate actions. Observing the outcomes 
of an action and changes in the environment closes the learning loop of the 
agent. While there are constant advancements in the understanding of 
cognitive processes and the maturity of cognitive architecture also increase, 
the prospect of developing a generic cyber defender using this approach in 
the near future is fairly limited. This is mainly due to difficulty in 
successfully capturing and assimilating all of the required knowledge 
regarding the complex dynamics of the cyber environment. It is more likely 
to benefit from small-scale specialized cognitive agents.  
• Zhong C et al. Automate cybersecurity data triage by leveraging human 
analysts’ cognitive process. Presented at the 2nd Big Data Security on 
Cloud; 2016 Apr 8–10; Columbia University, NY. 
The authors demonstrate how by capturing and analyzing traces of human 
defender’s behavior, it is possible to construct a model of the defender’s 
decision making process. A cognitive agent based on this model is then used 
to automate triage analysis yielding faster performance than human 
defenders but with similar accuracy. 
• Greitzer FL, Hohimer RE. Modeling human behavior to anticipate insider 
attacks. Journal of Strategic Security. 2011;4(2):25. 
This study combines traditional cyber security audit data with psychosocial 
data to develop a predictive model that supports the detection of insider 
threats. It reports on progress in defining a usable set of predictive indicators 
and developing a framework for integrating the analysis of organizational 
and cyber security data to yield predictions about possible insider exploits 
and developing the knowledge base and reasoning capability of such a 
system. The authors also outline the types of errors that one expects in a 
predictive system versus a detection system and discuss how those errors 
can affect the usefulness of their model.  
4.2 Perception and Representation of the Cyber Environment 
Cyber environments in which defenders operate are highly dynamic and differ 
considerably between organizations. As such, most cyber environments challenge 
human analytical capabilities by including high volume of data that come from a 
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variety of sensors. These real-time, high-velocity data streams with inherent 
veracity serve as the basis for the defender’s SA and decision-making processes. 
Therefore, multiple studies investigate and model how defenders perceive and 
internally represent cyber environments, including the following: 
• Ben-Asher N, Oltramari A, Erbacher RF, Gonzalez C. Ontology-based 
adaptive systems of cyber defense. Proceedings of the 10th International 
Conference on Semantic Technology for Intelligence, Defense, and Security 
(STIDS); 2015. 
Among other things, successful modeling of human cognition in cyber 
defense must carefully attend human knowledge representation and the 
interplay between knowledge representation and decision making. The 
authors use computational ontology to provide a knowledge base for an 
adaptive cognitive agent and evaluate the ability of this hybrid architecture 
to detect malicious network activity. The detailed representation of the 
cyber environment allowed a relatively simple cognitive model of a 
defender to learn from experience and accurately detect malicious port-
scanning. Beyond emphasizing the key role of in-depth knowledge 
representation in modeling human cognition, the paper demonstrates how 
knowledge is used in decision making, learning, and detection. 
• Robinson D, Cybenko G. A cyber-based behavioral model. The Journal of 
Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, 
Technology. 2012;9(3):195–203.  
At its core, cyber SA requires perceiving, encoding (representing), and 
understanding the environment in terms of how information, events, and 
actions will impact goals and objectives, both now and in the near future. 
This study models the cognitive layer of SA by defining a statistical 
behavioral model that is contingent on user activities. This model provides 
a representation of normal user behavior based on activities. Hence, 
deviations from the model prediction can be flagged as suspicious network 
activities. 
• Chen P-C et al. Experience-based cyber situation recognition using 
relaxable logic patterns. Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE International Multi-
Disciplinary Conference on Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and 
Decision Support; 2012. 
The authors developed a systematic approach to leverage experiences of 
defenders to enhance cyber situation recognition. Using a logic-based 
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approach, they efficiently capture and use defenders’ experiences, which 
are the categorized as kind of knowledge-based intrusion detection. 
• Yen J et al. RPD-based hypothesis reasoning for cyber SA. In: Cyber 
situational awareness. New York (NY): Springer US; 2010. p. 39–49. 
The paper describes a high-level, cognitively inspired framework that is 
built upon a Recognition-Primed Decision model, and integrates the 3 
components of the traditional SA model. The framework connects the logic 
world of tools for cyber SA with the mental world of human analysts, 
enabling the perception, comprehension, and prediction of cyber situations 
for better prevention, survival, and response to cyber attacks by adapting 
missions at the operational, tactical, and strategic levels. Further 
development is needed to formalize an executable computational model 
build based on this framework. 
• Domínguez IX et al. Human subtlety proofs: using computer games to 
model cognitive processes for cybersecurity. International Journal of 
Human-Computer Interaction; 2016 Oct 3. doi.org/10.1080/10447318 
.2016.1232229. 
The paper provides a brief overview of work in different areas of cyber-SA 
where cognitive modeling research plays a role with regard to direct 
interaction between end users and computer systems and with regard to the 
needs of security analysts working behind the scenes. The authors address 
the fundamental challenge of confirming whether the entity who triggered 
an activity in the cyber space is human or not (i.e., a software bot). The 
authors demonstrate that by calibrating cognitive models to human behavior 
it is possible to characterize human behavior and use it for generating 
human interactive proof for bot detection. 
• Greitzer FL, Hohimer RE. Modeling human behavior to anticipate insider 
attacks. Journal of Strategic Security. 2011;4(2):25. 
The authors propose a comprehensive threat assessment approach that will 
provide automated support for the detection of high-risk behavioral 
“triggers” to help focus the analyst’s attention and inform the analysis when 
detecting insider threat. This predictive modeling framework integrates a 
diverse set of data sources from the cyber domain as well as inferred 
psychological/motivational factors that may underlie malicious insider 
exploits. The main components of the framework are 1) ontologies, 
representing specialized domain knowledge, 2) reifiers, used for the 
ingesting of the primitive data types that are specified in the domain 
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ontologies, 3) memory storing facts asserted from the primitive data and 
the facts inferred by the reasoning system, and 4) reasoning components, 
used to interpret the data assertions and infer new assertions. 
• Siraj A, Vaughn RB. A cognitive model for alert correlation in a distributed 
environment. Proceedings of the International Conference on Intelligence 
and Security Informatics. Berlin: (Germany): Springer; 2005. 
In this paper the authors demonstrate the use of cognitive modeling of cause 
and effect relationships to correlate alerts in a distributed environment. By 
combining a casual knowledge-based inference technique together with 
fuzzy cognitive modeling, the authors were able to discover casual 
relationships in alert data in multiple datasets of cyber exercises. 
4.3 Learning 
Training defenders and their learning to detect new threats based on past 
experiences are 2 areas that can significantly benefit from modeling and simulating 
human cognition. Understanding the cognitive mechanisms that govern human 
adaptation to changes in the highly dynamic cyber environment is a key factor to 
threat and anomaly detection. The following papers study these issues using 
laboratory experimentation with a simplified Intrusion Detection System: 
• Dutt V et al. Modeling the effects of base-rates on cyber threat detection 
performance. Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on 
Cognitive Modeling. Berlin (Germany): Universitaetsverlag der TU; 2012. 
This paper used a cognitive model of a cyber defender to study memory 
retrieval, decision making, and learning from experience. More specifically, 
the model allowed examination of how defenders perceive and attend 
situational attributes. The cognitive model accounted for changes in 
defender’s performance when encountering different adversarial behavior. 
• Dutt V et al. Cyber situational awareness modeling detection of cyber 
attacks with instance-based learning theory. Human Factors: The Journal of 
the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. 2013:55(3):605–618. 
This paper examined through cognitive modeling how training, risk taking, 
and past experiences influence the defender’s judgment and decision 
making. Based upon model predictions, a defender’s prior threat 
experiences and tolerance to threats are likely to predict detection accuracy. 
In parallel, considering the nature of adversarial behavior, especially attacks 
base rate, is equally important. 
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4.4 Modeling Team Interactions and Decision Making 
Cyber defenders often work in heterogeneous and interdependent teams of 
individuals. Such teams plan, decide, perceive, design, solve problems, and act as 
an integrated system. Achieving and maintaining effective teamwork heavily 
depends on communication, information sharing, and collaboration. Typically, 
team members differ in their areas of expertise and their familiarity with different 
aspects of the network. Team interactive cognition is a key component to 
understanding team performance and synergistic behavior. Network security live 
exercises like Capture the Flag provide rich data for this line of research. The 
following papers focus on modeling and simulating cyber interactions at the team 
level:  
• Rajivan P et al. Agent-based model of a cyber security defense analyst team. 
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual 
Meeting. 2013;57(1). 
This study explored the effects of different collaboration strategies and team 
sizes on performance measures such as number of intrusion alerts accurately 
processed by the defenders and rewards they accrue from accurately 
processing the alerts. This study also explored the feasibility of using agent-
based modeling methodologies for studying team processes in the cyber 
defense context. The model revealed that specific collaboration strategies 
lead to better performance and that large teams are detrimental to 
performance. 
• Kotenko I. Agent-based modeling and simulation of cyber warfare between 
malefactors and security agents in Internet. Presented at the 19th European 
Simulation Multiconference; 2005. 
The author used teams of defender agents and attacker agents to simulate 
the dynamics in a Distributed Denial of Service attack. The paper presents 
the structure of the teams of agents, specifications of hierarchies of agent 
plans, agent interaction and coordination mechanisms, and agent role-
assignment mechanisms. 
• Ben-Asher N, Gonzalez C. CyberWar game: a paradigm for understanding 
new challenges of cyber war. In: Cyber warfare. Berlin (Germany): 
Springer; 2015. p. 207–220. 
This study examines the decision-making processes that drive the dynamics 
of cyber war using a multi-agent model comprising cognitive agents that 
learn to make decisions from experience. In this paradigm—the CyberWar 
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game—assets and power are 2 key attributes that influence the decisions of 
agents. Assets represent the key resource that an agent is protecting from 
attacks, while power represents technical prowess of an agent’s cyber 
security. All of the agents share the same goal of maximizing their assets, 
and they learn to attack other agents and defend themselves to meet this 
goal. These agents do not learn by using predefined strategies, as many 
multi-agent models do, but instead learn from experience according to the 
situation and actions of others, as suggested by many cognitive 
architectures. 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Multiple disciplines within cyber systems engineering and operations cannot take 
a mature, rigorous, and suitably advanced form—comparable to those in more 
mature technical findings—without availability of M&S tools that are specifically 
targeted for phenomena of cyber defense and produce results at several levels of 
detail. 
• Recommendation: Stress the need for M&S for a full range of cyber 
specialties—not only for training and rehearsal. We observe very limited 
availability of commercial products and probably a corresponding lack of 
commercial research and development. 
• Recommendation: Encourage participation of commercial companies, 
especially developers of products for military command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
requirements, in NATO STO activities and meetings, with an option to 
demonstrate their relevant products. Several types of simulations are 
especially relevant to NATO military operations, especially the ability to 
perform realistic wargaming of a cyber battle—attack and defense—and 
dynamic replanning for enhanced resilience of NATO systems and 
networks. 
• Recommendation: The types of simulation models that we call here 
Business Impact Simulation are particularly important for NATO mission 
planning, mission risk assessment, mission risk mitigation plans, enemy 
COA assessment, and mission damage assessment. On the other hand, types 
of simulation models that we call here Attack Details Simulation are crucial 
for NATO system engineering, model validation, forensic analysis, and 
generation of indicators. 
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• Recommendation: Produce a set of clear and concrete requirements for 
simulation tools specifically targeted at cyber defense mission planning and 
wargaming for a military unit in active operations against a cyber-capable 
adversary. This will encourage and guide the development of relevant tools 
in NATO nations’ government and industry. 
• Recommendation: Produce a set of clear and concrete requirements for 
simulation tools capable of simulating attack-defense scenarios at an 
observable level of network-and-system-level events. Approaches based on 
attack graphs and related methods appear to be most mature and suitable for 
certain types of simulation tools. They are likely to be actively pursued by 
commercial developers. 
• Recommendation: Minimize government investments in the line of 
approaches based on attack graphs and related methods to invest in other 
directions of cyber M&S. Human (both defenders and attackers) cognitive 
processes and resulting behaviors are crucial components of simulating a 
cyber battle. Approaches to such simulations are at the infancy stage. 
• Recommendation: NATO nations should encourage academic research 
targeted at effective and validated simulation of human cognitive processes 
and behaviors as they execute cyber defense and attack. Two recent large 
efforts—AMICA and the European Union’s Panoptesec—are highly 
valuable for understanding the state of the art, the gaps, and technical 
challenges. Lessons of such efforts should be actively studied and used as 
technical references in developing NATO cyber capabilities. Similarly, the 
utility of model-based approaches in SE (Estefan 2008) for cyber needs to 
be considered in view of their greater use in cyber space sectors.
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A-1 Background and Justification (Relevance to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) 
This technical activity proposal for a workshop addresses the recommendation from 
the research of the NATO Information Systems and Technology (IST) panel 
exploratory team, IST-ET-094: “Model-Driven Paradigms for Integrated 
Approaches for Cyber Defense”. Key findings of this research are that the science 
and technology (S&T) underpinning the developments of models, 
simulators/emulators, methods, and tools in support of an integrated cyber defense 
approach remain immature. Though some progress has been made in a few 
individual cyber-related topic areas (e.g., emulation for cyber ranges and training 
environments as well as attack graphs analysis), there is less evidence of integration 
and an interdisciplinary approach to address challenges in cyber defense, a priority 
strategic risk area for NATO and most, if not all, of its coalition nations. 
It is therefore argued that a new model-driven paradigm, interdisciplinary and 
coherent by design to link the technical areas, is needed for cyber defense to assist 
the integration of business or military operations with cyber defense, particularly 
in bridging the cognitive gap between operational decision makers and cyber 
defenders. This paradigm should support the ability, at the required level of 
abstraction, to translate operational priorities into cyber defense priorities and to 
translate impacts on the supporting cyber infrastructure into consequences 
expressed in operational terms. 
A-2 Objectives 
The objectives of the workshop are to provide such a forum and consider the S&T 
developments (what?, where?, and how?) that could be leveraged and form an 
integral part of a model-driven approach to arrive at a better representation, with 
varying levels of fidelity, of the socio-technical system (of systems) that comprise 
cyber security and defense against cyber threats. This includes the underpinning 
analytics to determine, with certain levels of validation or assurance, the 
effects/impacts of threats, options, and consequences of mitigations and actions. 
This needs outputs and evidence from a broad range of analysis activities: detecting 
attacks in a mission-supporting manner, assessing damages relevant to the mission, 
investigating impacts on mission elements, recovering from attacks in order to 
continue missions to the maximum extent possible, and deciding on how to respond 
to cyber attacks in a manner that maximizes mission success. Additionally, 
forensics methods and tools are necessary to determine key facts relevant to 
assessing mission impact. Such tools are used for evidence collection, analysis of 
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the attack, identification of the attacker, understanding the attack, damage 
assessment, and attribution of attackers. Depending on the mission and the type of 
an attack, there may be different degrees of relative importance and resources 
attached to attack detection, continuity of the mission, damage assessment, 
evidence collection, attribution, and other activities. Use of related methods, 
procedures, tools, or technology should depend largely on the mission. 
The following 4 themes emerge to provide focus for the workshop for modeling 
and simulation within this overall cyber defense context: 
• Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approaches: From MBSE 
developments in other sectors (e.g., land, air, and space), which methods, 
tools, and techniques can be best applied to socio-technical systems (of 
systems) that define cyber, their utility, and measures of effectiveness? In 
particular, how well can a MBSE approach address all layers from the 
cognitive and virtual to the physical as well as over the system life cycles? 
• Models for and simulation of attack (and defend) processes: What can be 
identified and inferred at a detailed level of observable events (e.g., system 
logs at lower levels) suitable for the validation of the model and verification 
of defensive measures? Important aspects include comparison with real 
events (threats and countermeasures where available), forensics, and 
warnings and indicators. 
• Better representation of modeling and sim(em)ulation of adversarial 
interactions between attackers and defenders and adversaries themselves: 
What are the effective high-level techniques and detailed game theoretic 
techniques for “war gaming” of a range of simple-to-complex scenarios in 
order to provide means by which solutions can be explored in an overall 
end-to-end chain of actions-counteraction in an attack or goal-compromise 
episode? 
• Modeling and sim(em)ulation of human cognition and behaviors: How can 
we model and “encode”’ human decision making and action/reaction of a 
human defender, including working with machines with increasing levels 
of autonomy, as a function of the environments, the situation at hand, 
different stimuli, knowledge, experience, and training? 
The expected outcome of the workshop is deeper insight into the S&T art of the 
possible, now and in the future, of a model-based systems approach applied to cyber 
defense—the utility, benefits, and challenges. Specific technical challenges that 
need to be addressed to extract value for enhanced cyber defense capability of 
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NATO and coalition nations. In addition, also expect some foresight on how the 2 
areas may evolve in the future and the opportunities and threats posed. 
A-3 Topics to Be Covered 
• Mature MBSE approaches for cyber defense 
• Enhanced models for and simulation of attack (and defend) processes 
• Better representation of modeling and sim(em)ulation of adversarial 
interactions between attackers and defenders, plus adversaries themselves 
• Effectiveness in the modeling and sim(em)ulation of human cognition and 
behaviors 
A-4 Deliverable (e.g., S/W Engage Model, Database,...) and/or 
End Product (e.g., Final Report) 
Technical Report; other deliverable(s): none 
Technical Team Leader: Co-Chair: Mr Jack Branhill, United Kingdom 
Lead Nation: United States 
A-5 Nations Willing/Invited to Participate 
NATO nations and bodies: Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Portugal, 
Romania, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
Partnership for Peace nations: Finland, Montenegro, and Sweden 
Mediterranean Dialogue nations: none 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative nations: none 
Global Partners: Australia 
Contact/other nations: none 
A-6 National and/or NATO Resources Needed (Physical and 
Nonphysical Assets) 
Nations are asked to provide, from their cyber community, leading subject matter 
experts and suitable representatives from their stakeholders, policy makers, and 
practitioners, including new STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Mathematics) staff. A background and experience, current or latent, in the 4 topics 
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detailed in Section C-3 and operational experience in implementing cyber defense 
solutions is very desirable. 
A-7 STO/CSO Resources Needed 
Provision of funding for and support for the arrangements of a technical evaluator 
for the workshop and 2 keynote speakers.
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Call for Papers 
 
Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation:  
Applications, Methodology, Technology (JDMS)  
 
Special Issue: Model-Driven Paradigms for Integrated Approaches to 
Cyber Defense 
 
Guest Editors  
Dr Alexander Kott, US Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, Maryland  
Introduction  
The growing military importance of cyber security is unquestionable. Increased use 
of commercial off-the-shelf information technology and dependency on 
computerized information systems for weapons, intelligence, communication, and 
logistics continues to increase vulnerability of military missions to cyber attacks. 
Successful mission execution requires highly capable technologies that result in 
forces performing a broad range of defensive cyber operations for each step of an 
attacker’s life cycle.  
While many of these defensive cyber operations rely on essentially ad hoc 
techniques, there is a growing realization within the cyber community that a 
comprehensive, systematic, principle-based modeling and simulation approach is 
more likely to produce long-term, lasting, and reusable approaches for defensive 
cyber operations. Such a paradigm is predicated on the creation and validation of 
mechanisms of modeling the organization whose mission is subject to assessment, 
the mission (or missions) itself, and the cyber-vulnerable systems that support the 
mission. The models are then used to simulate or otherwise portray the cyber 
attacks and associate defensive phenomena and system operations, including the 
assessment of mission impact.  
The main objective of this special issue is to offer the readers a broad, yet integrated 
exploration of the field while providing a publishing venue for researchers working 
toward a multipurpose, integrated system of cyber models that guide a broad range 
of cyber security operations, examples of which include vulnerability analysis, 
intrusion prevention, intrusion detection, analysis, forensics, attribution, mission 
impact assessment, and recovery.  
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Candidate model-driven paradigms questions for cyber defense include the 
following. Are there applications of the model-driven paradigm that are more likely 
to prove fruitful in the near term than others? What can be learned and adopted 
from the ongoing efforts, such as experiences in the European Union Panoptesec 
program that explores a model-based approach? What are ways to populate and 
validate models in an affordable fashion? Is the model-driven paradigm defeated 
by ever-growing diversity and diffusion of information technology infrastructures, 
such as Internet of Things? What commercial tools are emerging that can support 
the model-driven paradigm? Could these approaches be adapted for military-
specific requirements?  
Possible topics for authors to consider include the following:  
• Theoretical foundations and formulations of the model-driven paradigm  
• Relevance of game-theoretic and control-theoretic approaches  
• Formal languages for model specification 
• Assessment of barriers to successful use of the model-driven paradigm  
• Potential techniques for using model-driven paradigms for cyber defense 
problem solving at different phases of cyber operations (e.g., prior, during, 
and after discovery of a cyber compromise)  
• Analysis of known related approaches and methods  
• Complexity and completeness of the models  
• Feasibility of automated or semi-automated generation of models  
• Modeling of the adversary  
• Human factors in the models  
• Calibration of the models  
• Validation of the models  
• Maintenance of the models  
• Utility functions to be used in conjunction with models  
Papers submitted should not be concurrently under review at another conference, 
journal, or similar venue.  
Instructions for Manuscript Preparation  
For manuscript formatting and other guidelines, visit the Author Guidelines for 
JDMS. Manuscripts must not have been previously published or be submitted for 
publication elsewhere. Each submitted manuscript must include title, names, 
authors' affiliations, postal and e-mail addresses, and a list of keywords. For 
multiple author submission, please identify the corresponding author.  
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Due Dates  
Submission of papers: September 30, 2016 
Expected date of publication: Summer 2017 
Guest Editors:  
• Alexander Kott, PhD  
Chief of Network Science Division, US Army Research Laboratory, 
Adelphi, Maryland, USA  
• Nazife Baykal, PhD  
Professor, Director of Informatics Institute and Chair, Cyber Security 
Department, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey  
• Yilmaz Cankaya  
Chief Researcher, TÜBITAK BILGEM Cyber Security Institute, Kocaeli, 
Turkey  
• Bob Madahar, PhD  
Professor, Senior Fellow, DSTL, Porton, United Kingdom  
• Col. Nikolai Stoianov, PhD  
Associate Professor, Defence Institute “Prof. Tsvetan Lazarova”, Sofia, 
Bulgaria  
• Margaret Varga, PhD  
Director at Seetru Ltd, visiting fellow at the University of Oxford. Bristol, 
United Kingdom  
For questions contact:  
Vicki Pate, Managing Editor \Journal of Defense Modeling & Simulation:  
vmpate@scs.org  
Dr Alexander Kott, Guest Editor: alexander.kott1.civ@mail.mil
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TECHNICAL ACTIVITY PROPOSAL (TAP) 
 
ACTIVITY REFERENCE 
NUMBER  IST-___ 
ACTIVITY TITLE 
 
Model-Driven Paradigms for Integrated Approaches to 
Cyber Defence 
APPROVAL 
2015 
TYPE AND SERIAL 
NUMBER ET-___ 
START 
December 2015 
LOCATION(S) AND DATES TBD 
END 
July 2016 
COORDINATION WITH OTHER BODIES NATO ACT, NCIA, CCDCOE 
NATO CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIVITY NATO UNCLASSIFIED, RELEASABLE TO PUBLIC 
Non-NATO Invited 
Yes 
PUBLICATION DATA  R NU 
KEYWORDS Cyber Defense Operations, Computer Information Systems (CIS), Information & Communications Technology (ICT), Modeling and Simulation 
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C-1 Background and Justification (Relevance to North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization [NATO]): 
The growing military importance of cyber space and cyber security is 
unquestionable. The increased use of commercial off-the-shelf information 
technology and dependency on computer information systems for weapons, 
intelligence, communication, and logistics continues to increase vulnerability of 
military missions to cyber attacks. Successful execution of NATO missions 
requires highly capable technologies that allow the forces to perform a broad range 
of defensive cyber operations, including vulnerability identification, risk 
characterization, continuous monitoring, evidence collection, analysis of the attack, 
identification of the attacker, understanding the attack, forensic analysis, damage 
assessment, mission impact assessment, attribution of attackers, threat analysis, 
remedial stabilization of the system, active response to attach and preventive 
actions. 
While much of these defensive activities currently rely on essentially ad hoc 
techniques, there is a growing realization within the cyber community that 
comprehensive, systematic, principle-based modeling and simulation are more 
likely to produce long-term, lasting, reusable approaches to defensive cyber 
operations. In particular, a recent NATO workshop (IST-128) voiced a strong 
consensus that substantive solutions for at least some classes of cyber challenges, 
for example mission impact assessment, was in adopting and developing a new 
model-driven paradigm.  
Such a paradigm is predicated on creation and validation of mechanisms of 
modeling the organization whose mission is subject to assessment, the mission (or 
missions) itself, and the cyber-vulnerable systems that support the mission. The 
models are then used to simulate or otherwise portray the cyber attacks and 
associate defensive phenomena and system operations, including the assessment of 
mission impact. In addition, such model-based analysis could be used to explore 
multiple alternative mitigation and work-around strategies and select the optimal 
course of mitigating actions.  
Furthermore, the model-driven paradigm applied to cyber operations is likely to 
benefit traditional disciplines of cyber defense, such as vulnerability analysis, 
intrusion prevention, intrusion detection, analysis, forensics, attribution, and 
recovery. For example, intrusion detection, especially for zero-day or polymorphic 
attacks, would greatly benefit from the ability to model the observable effects of a 
hypothetic attack.
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C-2 Objective(s): 
The main objective of the activity is to perform a broad and unconstrained 
exploration of the possibility of using a multipurpose, integrated system of models 
for guiding a broad range of cyber security operations: vulnerability analysis, 
intrusion prevention, intrusion detection, analysis, forensics, attribution, mission 
impact assessment, and recovery. The team will investigate whether such a 
paradigm can be expected to provide meaningful, actionable information about 
cyber activities and the resulting impacts that have not been seen before or do not 
match prior experiences and patterns. 
To be sure, a model-driven paradigm presents a number of serious challenges both 
practical and theoretical. For example, a major challenge is to create and maintain 
an appropriate model. Manual generation of such a complex model appears possible 
in some cases but prohibitively expensive and impossible to maintain in the long 
term. Therefore, it will be ET-094’s charter to explore such challenges and answer 
a number of questions, such as the following: How likely these challenges be 
overcome in the near- and mid-term? Are there applications of the model-driven 
paradigm that are more likely to prove fruitful in near-term than others? What can 
be learned and adopted from the ongoing efforts, such as experiences in the 
European Union Panoptesec program that explore a model-based approach? What 
are ways to populate and validate models in an affordable fashion? Is the model-
driven paradigm defeated by ever-growing diversity and diffusion of information 
technology infrastructures, such as the Internet of Things? What commercial tools 
are emerging that can support the model-driven paradigm? Could these be adapted 
for military-specific requirements? 
C-3 Topics to Be Covered 
• Theoretical foundations and formulations of the model-driven paradigm 
• Relevance of game-theoretic and control-theoretic approaches 
• Formal languages for model specification 
• Assessment of barriers to successful use of the model-driven paradigm     
• Potential techniques for using model-driven paradigm for cyber defense 
problem solving at different phases of cyber operations (e.g., prior, 
during, and after discovery of a cyber compromise) 
• Analysis of known related approaches and methods 
• Complexity and completeness of the models 
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• Feasibility of automated or semi-automated generation of models 
• Modeling of the adversary 
• Human factors in the models 
• Calibration of the models 
• Validation of the models 
• Maintenance of the models 
• Utility functions to be used in conjunction with models 
C-4 Deliverables and/or End Product  
• Final Report 
• Collection of materials (briefs, papers, etc.) assembled in support of the 
Final Report 
• Recommendations regarding the model-driven paradigms for cyber 
defense, including topics for future activities if appropriate 
C-5 Technical Team Leader and Lead Nation: 
Chair:   TBD 
Lead Nation:  TBD 
C-6 Nations Willing/Invited to Participate: 
Poland, Rumania, Turkey, Germany, United States  
Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations: all PfP invited 
Mediterranean Dialogue nations: none 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative nations: none 
Global Partners: none 
Contact/Other nations: none 
C-7 National and/or NATO Resources Needed (Physical and 
Nonphysical Assets) 
• Support from national host for meeting  
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C-8 RTA Resources Needed (e.g., Consultant Funding) 
• None 
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After reviewing commercial off-the-shelf solutions, we identified Skybox Security 
as a commercially available cyber security management software. Skybox was 
contacted and agreed to organize a presentation in April 2016. The following is a 
summary of findings resulting from this presentation. 
Their solution seems quite advanced in terms of network discovery, reachability 
map reconstruction, and capability to manipulate this reconstruction via a graphical 
user interface (GUI). The tool is able to use different vulnerability scanners to 
extract vulnerability data. Skybox uses a Panoptesec-similar algorithm for the 
computation of the attack paths, based on the Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures system (https://cve.mitre.org/), and proactively analyses the network to 
propose mitigation actions for risk reduction. While Skybox’s cyber security 
management software is similar to the Panoptesec approach, it does not take into 
account business-related analysis. It is possible to define some particular devices as 
critical, to avoid or optimize the instantiation of the mitigation actions on them, but 
no more than that. Skybox completely avoids the reactive perspective, and the 
company is actually seeking and developing its reactive approach. Skybox seems 
to be quite strong on the configuration/GUI and seems able to manage thousands 
of devices, which means their attack path algorithms are quite optimized. The 
interesting discovery is the lack of an evolved business mission engine. The 
engineer who made the demo for me seemed to understand my questions about such 
an engine, but I am not sure it is in the development plan of the company to go 
much deeper in this direction (compared with the kind of evolution we envisioned 
for our exploratory team). Skybox, in conclusion, is not particularly advanced in 
terms of the concepts we analyzed and apparently not extremely interested in them. 
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List of Symbols, Abbreviations, and Acronyms 
AMICA analyzing mission impacts of cyber actions 
CAMIAC Cyber Attack Modeling and Impact Assessment Component 
COA course of action 
CR cyber range 
CySeMoL Cyber Security Modeling Language 
GUI graphical user interface 
IST Information Systems and Technology 
IT information technology 
JDMS Journal of Defense Modelling and Simulation 
M&S modeling and simulation 
MAST Malicious Activity Simulation Tool 
MBSE Model-Based Systems Engineering 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
PfP Partnership for Peace 
S&T science and technology 
SA situational awareness 
SE Systems Engineering 
SIR Susceptible, Infected, Recovered 
STO Science and Technology Organization 
UK United Kingdom 
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